Ethical non-naturalism

Ethical Non-Naturalism

Ethical non-naturalism is a position in meta-ethics that asserts that ethical statements express propositions that cannot be reduced to natural properties. This view is contrasted with ethical naturalism, which holds that ethical truths are grounded in natural facts about the world.

Historical Background

Ethical non-naturalism has its roots in the work of philosophers such as G. E. Moore, who famously argued against ethical naturalism in his book Principia Ethica (1903). Moore introduced the "open question argument" to demonstrate that ethical properties cannot be equated with natural properties.

The Open Question Argument

The open question argument is a central tenet of ethical non-naturalism. It posits that for any proposed naturalistic definition of a moral term, it is always an open question whether the definition captures the essence of the moral term. For example, if one defines "good" as "pleasurable," it remains an open question whether all pleasurable things are indeed good.

Key Features of Ethical Non-Naturalism

Irreducibility

Ethical non-naturalists maintain that moral properties are irreducible to natural properties. This means that moral facts are sui generis and cannot be fully explained by physical or psychological facts.

Objectivity

Non-naturalists often argue that moral truths are objective, meaning they are independent of human beliefs or attitudes. This objectivity is seen as a way to account for the apparent universality and necessity of moral truths.

Intuitionism

Many ethical non-naturalists, such as Moore, are also intuitionists. They believe that humans have a special faculty of moral intuition that allows them to directly apprehend moral truths.

Criticisms of Ethical Non-Naturalism

The "Queerness" Argument

Philosopher J. L. Mackie famously criticized ethical non-naturalism with his "argument from queerness." Mackie argued that if moral properties were non-natural, they would be metaphysically "queer" or strange, and it would be difficult to explain how we could have knowledge of them.

Epistemological Challenges

Critics also question how we can have knowledge of non-natural moral properties. If moral truths are not grounded in natural facts, it is unclear how we can come to know them or verify them.

Related Concepts

• Moral realism
• Moral anti-realism
• Intuitionism (ethics)
• Emotivism

Conclusion

Ethical non-naturalism remains a significant position in meta-ethics, offering a robust account of moral objectivity and irreducibility. However, it faces challenges regarding the metaphysical and epistemological status of moral properties.