Expressivism

Expressivism

Expressivism is a philosophical theory primarily associated with meta-ethics, which suggests that moral statements do not describe states of the world but rather express the speaker's attitudes or emotions towards a particular issue. This theory contrasts with cognitivism, which holds that moral statements are capable of being true or false because they describe some aspect of the world.

Historical Background

Expressivism has its roots in the early 20th century, with philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson being pivotal in its development. Ayer's work, particularly in "Language, Truth, and Logic", laid the groundwork for what would later be known as emotivism, a precursor to expressivism. Stevenson expanded on these ideas, emphasizing the persuasive and emotive function of moral language.

Key Concepts

Non-Cognitivism

Expressivism is a form of non-cognitivism, which argues that moral statements do not express propositions and cannot be true or false. Instead, they express the speaker's attitudes, emotions, or prescriptions.

Attitude Expression

According to expressivism, when someone makes a moral statement like "Stealing is wrong," they are not stating a fact about the world but are expressing their disapproval of stealing. This expression of disapproval is akin to saying "Boo to stealing!"

The Frege-Geach Problem

One of the significant challenges for expressivism is the Frege-Geach problem, which questions how moral statements can retain their meaning in complex logical constructs if they are merely expressions of emotion. For example, in the argument "If stealing is wrong, then getting your little brother to steal is wrong," expressivists must explain how the meaning of "stealing is wrong" is preserved in the conditional form.

Variants of Expressivism

Emotivism

Emotivism is an early form of expressivism that focuses on the emotive function of moral language. It suggests that moral statements are expressions of emotional responses and are used to influence others' attitudes and actions.

Quasi-Realism

Simon Blackburn developed quasi-realism, a sophisticated form of expressivism that seeks to "earn the right" to talk about moral truths and facts while maintaining a non-cognitivist stance. Quasi-realists argue that we can talk as if there are moral facts without committing to their existence.

Projectivism

Projectivism, associated with John Mackie, suggests that our moral judgments project our subjective attitudes onto the world, making it seem as though there are objective moral properties.

Criticisms

Expressivism faces several criticisms, including the Frege-Geach problem, the challenge of explaining moral disagreement, and the difficulty of accounting for the apparent objectivity of moral discourse. Critics argue that expressivism struggles to explain how moral language can be both expressive and capable of logical analysis.

Conclusion

Expressivism offers a compelling account of moral language by focusing on the expressive function of moral statements. While it faces significant challenges, it remains an influential theory in contemporary meta-ethics, prompting ongoing debate and refinement.

See Also

• Cognitivism
• Moral realism
• Non-cognitivism
• Emotivism

References

• Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth, and Logic. London: Gollancz, 1936.
• Blackburn, Simon. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
• Stevenson, Charles L. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.